

# DDAS Accident Report

## Accident details

<b>Report date:</b> 15/07/2011	<b>Accident number:</b> 762
<b>Accident time:</b> Not recorded	<b>Accident Date:</b> 05/05/2007
<b>Where it occurred:</b> CBU 829, Area 2 Ayta Ash Shaab town	<b>Country:</b> Lebanon
<b>Primary cause:</b> Inadequate survey (?)	<b>Secondary cause:</b> Other (?)
<b>Class:</b> Missed-mine accident	<b>Date of main report:</b> 09/05/2007
<b>ID original source:</b> BOI 005/07	<b>Name of source:</b> UN MACC SL
<b>Organisation:</b> [Name removed]	
<b>Mine/device:</b> MZD-2 submunition	<b>Ground condition:</b> rocks/stones
<b>Date record created:</b>	<b>Date last modified:</b> 15/07/2011
<b>No of victims:</b> 0	<b>No of documents:</b> 1

## Map details

<b>Longitude:</b>	<b>Latitude:</b>
<b>Alt. coord. system:</b> UTM 719524-664828	<b>Coordinates fixed by:</b>
<b>Map east:</b>	<b>Map north:</b>
<b>Map scale:</b>	<b>Map series:</b>
<b>Map edition:</b>	<b>Map sheet:</b>
<b>Map name:</b>	

## Accident Notes

no independent investigation available (?)  
inadequate investigation (?)  
inadequate survey (?)  
inadequate equipment (?)  
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)  
non injurious accident (?)

## Accident report

The report of this incident was made available by the UN MACC in 2008. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File Reference: BOI 005/07

BAC INCIDENT REPORT 009/2007

### **INVESTIGATION REPORT ON A MZD 2 SUB-MUNITION AT CBU 829, Area 2 Ayta Ash Shaab on the 5th May 2007**

The Incident occurred in Area 2 (CBU 829), UTM 719524-664828 on the 5th May 2007, on a Completed Site where one MZD 2 Sub-Munition was located when an access road was being constructed.

References:

- Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)
- International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
- [Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
- [Demining group] Completion Report CBU 829

#### **Introduction**

1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC SL Programme Manager, Mr. [Name removed] and Lt.Col [Name removed], NDO Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on Friday the 7th May 2007, for an incident investigation independent inquiry. The MACC SL board members are Capt [Name removed] LAF Operations Officer Areas 1-5, MACC SL and [Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL.

2. This is a comprehensive report by the investigation board into the BAC Incident that occurred on the 5th May 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining group] completion report:

Date: 5th May 2007. Time of Incident: not known.

Location: Ayta Ash Shaab, Area 2, Lebanon, Task: CBU-829

UTM of location of the munition: 719524-664828

Task Start / Finish Date: 8th November to 19th December 2006

Reported by: MACC, SL, CLO [Name removed].

Reported to: Operations Department, MACC SL

Time of Incident report to MACC QA: N/A

MA Organisation POC: [Name removed], PM [Demining group]

Investigation Date/Time: 7th May 2007 1400hrs

Investigation Location: Task Dossier 2-007, CBU - 829

Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer, Areas 1-5 and [Name removed], MACC SL C of QA Officer.

Explosive Ordnance Type: MZD 2 Submunition

#### **Background**

4. CBU 829 forms a part of 3 CBUs in task Dossier 2-007 issued to [Demining group] for clearance as part of the sub-munitions clearance programme in SL. CBU 829 was completed

on the 13 April 2007, see annex A for the [Demining group] Completion Report for CBUs 829,830 and 604. According to the [Demining group] file for the task was a combination of surface and sub-surface clearance in accordance the TSGs and the operational clearance plan, with a position left uncleared due to the unusable nature of the land. This area is likely to contain additional MZD 2s. A combined total of 81,300m<sup>2</sup> was cleared, of which 39,500m<sup>2</sup> was sub-surface cleared. A total of 181 MZD 2 were located and destroyed during clearance..

### **Events leading up to the Incident**

6. The land owner, [Name removed], immediately contacted the CLO area 1-5 on the 5th May 2007 to report the location and the events surrounding the incident. This site was visited by MACC SL Operations, QA and the CLO to conduct an investigation of the event surrounding the discovery of the sub-munitions.



The accident site

### **BOI Post Incident Activities and General Observations**

7. On arrival at the incident site, it was ascertained that they could gain safe access up to the incident site without additional clearance being conducted. During the visit on the 7th May 07 it was possible to clearly view the location of the MZD 2.

8. On the inspection of the incident site on the 7th May 2007 the following general observations were established:

- The land area in which the MZD 2 was located had been developed to allow the construction of an access road.
- A significant amount of earth and rocks had been relocated for other area to form the road.



The MZ-2 submunition in-situ

### **Geography and Weather**

9. CBU 829 is located, with the nearest Town being Ayta Ash Shaab. The land is primarily is used for agriculture, but some construction is being undertaken on the site.

### **Conclusions**

10. Based on the investigation, the documentation and visit to the site, the investigation concludes the following:

- CBU 829 was previously surface cleared as part of a task dossier 2-007, and included CBUs 830 and 604, issued by the MACC SL to [Demining group].
- The location of the submunitions was identified as in an area that clearance had taken place.
- The MZD 2 was located at ground level, was in good condition, free of dirt and no damage was seen (see attached photos).
- An un-cleared area remains which may have MZD 2 located inside.
- The land owner wished to have the un-cleared area searched.
- It is unlikely that the MZD 2 sub-munitions would have been positioned in the location with little damage, free of spoil and completely above or on the surface given the amount of earthworks that was undertaken in the immediate and exact location of the MZD 2.

### **Recommendations**

11. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:

- CLOs to continue to warn local residence of areas have been cleared and the remaining un-cleared areas present a continued danger.
- Appropriate warning signs are erected in areas where there are un-cleared areas.
- Identify the un-cleared areas for future clearance priorities.

Signed: [Name removed], C/QA Officer, MACC SL, [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer, Area 1-5, NDO/MACC SL

9th May 2007

Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA  
[None]

[Name removed], UN Chief QA, MACC SL

Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations  
[None]  
[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL

Seen/Agreed  
[Name removed], UN Programme Manager, MACC SL

Seen/Agreed  
[Name removed], NDO Representative, MACC SL

### **Analysis**

The primary cause of this Missed mine/device incident is listed as *Inadequate survey* because the area had been subjected to a surface search when it should have been sub-surface searched. The decision to conduct superficial surface search in areas where agricultural and construction activity would take place was the responsibility of the MACC SL, the same body

that investigated the incident, so no independent investigation was made. The secondary cause is listed as *Other* because it is possible that the submunition was placed later.

The visual search of an area where devices may be below the ground surface is not “clearance” as defined in the IMAS and increases the risk of civilian injury because it encourages them to think that the area is safe to use.

It is noteworthy that the MACC SL BOI team “ascertained that they could gain safe access to the incident site without additional clearance being conducted”, then entered the area without PPE (photographs show this) and without searching for submunitions that may have been close enough to the surface to have been disturbed by footfalls. This might be considered irresponsible and unprofessional.

The *Inadequate investigation* referenced under Notes is included because the investigator’s conclusions are anything but conclusive. They imply that the device may have been placed where it was found. They do not seem to consider that it may have been missed during a visual search, or may have rolled into position during earth moving in the area.

The *Inadequate equipment* referenced under Notes refers to the lack of a means of searching sub-surface (metal-detector). No criticism of the commercial demining group is implied – it was apparently carrying out the task as directed by the UN supported MACC.