

# DDAS Accident Report

## Accident details

<b>Report date:</b> 15/07/2011	<b>Accident number:</b> 761
<b>Accident time:</b> Not recorded	<b>Accident Date:</b> 06/06/2007
<b>Where it occurred:</b> DA 483, See GPS coordinates	<b>Country:</b> Lebanon
<b>Primary cause:</b> Other (?)	<b>Secondary cause:</b> Other (?)
<b>Class:</b> Missed-mine accident	<b>Date of main report:</b> 06/06/2007
<b>ID original source:</b> None	<b>Name of source:</b> UN MACC SL
<b>Organisation:</b> [Name removed]	
<b>Mine/device:</b> M77 submunition	<b>Ground condition:</b> rocks/stones route (verge)
<b>Date record created:</b>	<b>Date last modified:</b> 15/07/2011
<b>No of victims:</b> 0	<b>No of documents:</b> 1

## Map details

<b>Longitude:</b>	<b>Latitude:</b>
<b>Alt. coord. system:</b> UTM 707893-680159	<b>Coordinates fixed by:</b>
<b>Map east:</b>	<b>Map north:</b>
<b>Map scale:</b>	<b>Map series:</b>
<b>Map edition:</b>	<b>Map sheet:</b>
<b>Map name:</b>	

## Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)  
no independent investigation available (?)  
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)  
inadequate equipment (?)

## Accident report

The record of this incident was supplied by the UN MACC SL but did not include an investigation report, merely an email exchange with the demining group which has searched the land on which an M77 submunition was later found. This exchanged is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial.

To: [Name removed] TOM [Demining group] Lebanon

From: Mr [Name removed] TFM [Demining group] Lebanon

Date: 06 June 2007

Attachment: Photos supporting text.

**Re: One M77 Sub munitions found in DA 483 by [Demining group] completed task.**

**General information:**

[Demining group] Team 9 cleared CBU 483. QA completion was carried out by MACC SL and NDO together with [Demining group] Compliance section.

**Clearance Plan:**

Visual clearance was conducted and some areas were chosen for subsurface verification as well.

**Events leading up to the find:**

It was brought to neighboring Site Supervisor s attention that a M77 sub munitions had been found inside cleared CBU 483.

The Supervisor [Name removed] notified the TFM who did an investigation.

**Specifications of UXO:**

The M77 found was not armed.

**Actions taken by TFM:**

[Demining group] TFM confirmed the M 77 to be inside the boundaries of cleared area.

[Demining group] TFM measured in the item via GPS UTM 707893-680159

[Demining group] TFM took photos of the item and removed it for destruction.

[Demining group] TFM produced a report of this incident to be forward to [Demining group] TOM.

**Probable cause.**

The item (M 77) was located on a road inside and between cleared areas. The road itself has been cleared and the item is so obvious that it cant been missed during clearance. See photo attached for road condition.

There are indications that the M 77 has been in contact with stone suggesting that someone tried to detonate it by throwing it towards a stony area or even worse, hitting

it with stones. Since it wasn't armed no detonation was achieved and it was brought to the road and placed there right on the surface.

**Recommendations:**

[Demining group] TFM has no recommendation in this case. QA section MACC SL has requested a report.

Signed 06 June 2007

[Name removed], [Name removed], TFM [Demining group], Lebanon.



Red arrow points at M77 found. The road is a hard gravel road.



Yellow arrow points at Detonator sleeve in unarmed position  
Green arrow points at area where the M 77 been in contact with stone

## Analysis

The primary and secondary causes of this incident are listed as a *Management Control Inadequacy* because no independent investigation was conducted. The conclusion of the demining group involved was that the device had been placed after their search of the area, and the photographic evidence supports this claim. However, the photographs show a device that the investigators must have already interacted with because the “Detonator sleeve” (more correctly an “arming slide”) has been gagged to prevent the device becoming “live”. This puts the authenticity of the photographs in question. Without an independent investigation, it is not possible to gauge whether the device was missed or placed later.

Despite the reliability of the demining group involved, the MACC SL who had ordered the clearance should have conducted their own independent investigation – especially as they apparently decided that no corrective actions were needed.

A visual search in an area where ground movement (road building) will take place is generally held to be inadequate. No criticism of the demining group is implied – it was apparently carrying out the task as directed by the UN supported MACC.

The *Inadequate equipment* referenced under Notes refers to the lack of a means of searching sub-surface (metal-detector). No criticism of the demining group is implied – it was carrying out the task as approved by the UN supported MACC.

