

# DDAS Accident Report

## Accident details

<b>Report date:</b> 09/07/2011	<b>Accident number:</b> 732
<b>Accident time:</b> Not recorded	<b>Accident Date:</b> 17/04/2007
<b>Where it occurred:</b> CBU 186, Area 7 AI - Smaaieh	<b>Country:</b> Lebanon
<b>Primary cause:</b> Inadequate training (?)	<b>Secondary cause:</b> Management/control inadequacy (?)
<b>Class:</b> Missed-mine accident	<b>Date of main report:</b> 01/06/2007
<b>ID original source:</b> BOI 007/07	<b>Name of source:</b> UN MACC SL
<b>Organisation:</b> [Name removed]	
<b>Mine/device:</b> M77 Submunition	<b>Ground condition:</b> pylons and surrounds route (verge)
<b>Date record created:</b>	<b>Date last modified:</b> 09/07/2011
<b>No of victims:</b> 0	<b>No of documents:</b> 1

## Map details

<b>Longitude:</b>	<b>Latitude:</b>
<b>Alt. coord. system:</b> UTM: 708166/678141	<b>Coordinates fixed by:</b>
<b>Map east:</b>	<b>Map north:</b>
<b>Map scale:</b>	<b>Map series:</b>
<b>Map edition:</b>	<b>Map sheet:</b>
<b>Map name:</b>	

## Accident Notes

inadequate training (?)  
non injurious accident (?)

## Accident report

The report of this incident was made available by the UN MACC SL in 2008. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

### File Reference: BOI 007/07

MINE ACTION COORDINATION CENTRE, SOUTHERN LEBANON, BAC INCIDENT REPORT 008/2007

Report on Incident that occurred on the 17th April 2007 at CBU 186, Area 7 AI - Smaaieh  
INVESTIGATION REPORT ON MISSED SUB-MUNITION AT CBU 186, AREA 7 AL -  
SMAAIEH

The Incident occurred on April 17 2007 in Area 7 on a Completed Site (CBU 186),  
UTM 708166 - 678141, where a Sub-Munition was located, sub-surface, during construction  
work.

References:

- Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)
- International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
- [Demining group] Completion file CBU 186

**Introduction**

1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSG's), the MACC SL Programme Manager, Mr. [Name removed] and Lt.Col [Name removed], NDO Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on 17th April 2007, for an incident investigation independent inquiry. The MACC SL board members are Capt [Name removed] LAF Operations Officer MACC SL and [Name removed], QA Officer MACC SL.

2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Demining Incident that occurred on the 17th April 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation and [Demining group] Completion file CBU 186

Date: 17th April 2007

Time of Incident: 171200hrs April 2007

Location: AL - SMAAIEH, Area 7-004, Lebanon

Task: CBU-186, Task Dossier 7-004

BM UTM: 708166 - 678141

Task Start / Finish Date: 17th September to 14th October 06

Reported by: [Demining group] TFM, [Name removed]

Reported to: Operations Officer, [Name removed], MACC SL

Time of Incident report to MACC QA: Approx. 1230hrs 17th April 2007

MA Organisation POC: [Name removed], Technical Operations Manager

Investigation Date/Time: 17th April 07, PM

Investigation Location: Task CBU-186

Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer and [Name removed], MACC SL QA Officer.

Explosive Ordnance Type: M77 Sub-Munition

**Background**

4. CBU 186 was completed on the 14th October 06, see annex A for [Demining group] Completion Report. According to the Completion Report the task was a combination of surface and sub-surface clearance in accordance with the operational clearance plan.

### **Events leading up to the Incident**

5. The CBU was located when an excavator dug out an irrigation canal beside a road that cuts right through CBU 186.

### **Events following the Incident**

6. The sub-munition was destroyed 17th April 2007, as directed by MACC SL.

### **BOI Post Incident Activities and General Observations**

7. On the inspection of the incident site on the 17th April 2007 the following observation was established:

- The sub-munition was located on the surface, in a declared, sub-surface cleared area.
- The sub-munition was removed from a mound of soil that had been excavated from an area adjacent to a road, during excavation of a retaining wall and then the sub-munition was placed in this area.
- The [Demining group] completion documents indicated the area was sub-surface cleared, however where the clearance bordered the road and where overhead power lines were present the area was only surface cleared due to interference when operating detectors. Sub-surface clearance had taken place approx. 2-3m from the edge of the road to reduce interference from overhead power cables.

### **Geography and Weather**

8. CBU 186 is located in the Province of Tyre, with the nearest Town being AL - SMAAIEH

### **Conclusions**

9. Based on the investigation, the documentation and visit to the site, the BOI concludes the following:

- The sub-munition was found, sub-surface, in an area that had been visually searched.
- The sub-munition was found in an area declared being sub-surfaced cleared.
- There is a discrepancy between the actual clearance conducted and the Completion documents.

### **Recommendations**

10. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:

- Sub-surface clearance of the area adjacent to the road
- It is imperative that all clearance documentation accurately reflects the clearance conducted.
- [Demining group] to submit a report

Signed: [Name removed], QA Officer, MACC SL. Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer, NDO/MACC SL

June 1 2007

Annex: [Demining group] Completion File CBU 186, available at the MACC SL. [Not made available.]

Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA: [None]

[Name removed], UN Chief QA, MACC SL: [None]

[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL: [None]

Comments by the UN Programme Manager, MACC SL: [None]

## **Analysis**

The Primary cause of this incident is listed as *Inadequate training* because the demining group apparently had detectors that could not operate near power lines, (if they had the detector reported in other incidents, they simply did not know how to use the detector near power lines). Their failure to recognise that there are other procedures that can be used when detectors are inappropriate was another example of a training inadequacy. The secondary cause is listed as a *Management Control Inadequacy* because the demining group reported the area as having been sub-surface searched when it had not, and the group's management bears responsibility for the accuracy of its reporting.