

DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 08/07/2011	Accident number: 725
Accident time: 09:00	Accident Date: 20/08/2007
Where it occurred: CBU 855, Area 1-001, Al Hinnieh	Country: Lebanon
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)	Secondary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident	Date of main report: 24/08/2007
ID original source: 013/07	Name of source: UN MACC SL
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: M77 submunition	Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
Date record created:	Date last modified: 08/07/2011
No of victims: 0	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system:	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

no independent investigation available (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
non injurious accident (?)

Accident report

The report of this incident was made available in 2008. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

BAC INCIDENT REPORT 013/07

Report on Incident that occurred on the 20th August 2007 at CBU 855, Area 1, Al Hinnieh

The Incident occurred in Area 1 (CBU 855), UTM 706470-3673983 on the 20 August 2007, on a Completed Site where one M77 Sub-Munition was located inside an orchard.

References:

Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)

[Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

[Demining group] Completion Report CBU 855

Introduction

1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC SL Programme Manager, Mr [Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL, issued a Verbal Convening Order on the 20th August 2007, for an incident investigation independent inquiry. [Name removed] QA Officer UN MACC SL was to produce this report.

2. This is a report by [Name removed] into the BAC Incident that occurred on the 20 August 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining group] completion report:

Date: 20 August 2007

Time of Incident: 9am.

Location: Al Hinnieh Area 1, South Lebanon

Task: CBU-855

UTM of location of the munition: 706470-3673983

Task Start / Finish Date: 16 April 2007 to 27 April 2007

Reported by: [Name removed], QA Officer UNMACC SL.

Reported to: Chief Quality Assurance, MACC SL

Time of Incident report to UNMACC /LMACC

MA Organisation POC: Mr. [Name removed], PM [Demining group]

Investigation Date/Time: 20 August 2007 at 9 am by Sgt [Name removed], team leader LAF Sampling Team and 21 August 2007 at 7am. by [Name removed], QA Officer

Investigation Location: Task Dossier Area 1-001, CBU - 855

Investigation Team: Sgt Nour El Dine LAF Sampling Team and [Name removed], QA Officer, MACC SL.

Explosive Ordnance Type: M77 Sub-munition

Background

3. The LAF Sampling Team, was tasked by LMACC on the 17 August 2007 to conduct a reconnaissance of CBU 855 , Task Dossier, Area 1-001 in order to confirm the CBU turning points and areas for site setup. It had been identified that [Demining group] had previously conducted clearance operation on this CBU and a Sampling team were to sample 10% of the area.

4. On the 20 Aug 07 the team deployed to CBU 855 in order to setup for BAC sampling operations. The team leader is Sgt [Name removed] and the QA Officer [Name removed] was to assist in the team's operations.

Events leading up to the Incident

5. Team Leader, Sgt [Name removed] was approached by a local worker on BCU 855 on the 20th Aug 2007, around 9am. Sgt [Name removed] was told that a sub munition was found inside the orchard. Sgt [Name removed] informed LMACC and UNMACC SL. He conducts an appreciation of the event surrounding the discovery of the sub-munitions and took photos.



[The M77]

BOI Post Incident Activities and General Observations

6. On arrival at the incident site, it was ascertained that there is safe access from the control point to the incident site without additional clearance being conducted.



[The site]

7. On the inspection of the incident site on the 20 August 2007 the following general observations were established:

The sub munition was a M77, intact and showed traces of rust on the outer casing

The M77 was located on top of the surface.

The M77 was inside CBU 855.

8. [Name removed] return to CBU 855 on the 21 Aug 07 to confirm the sub munition and to take photos in order to write this report. The BACTEC EOD team arrived on site and removed the M77 from the site and was later destroyed.

Geography and Weather

9. CBU 855 is located, with the nearest Town being Al Hinnieh. The land is primarily is used for agriculture.

Conclusions

10. Based on the investigation, the documentation and visit to the site, the investigation concludes the following:

The local worker stated the M77 was found in July 2007 subsurface. The orchard has been watered since the findings and now found the second time subsurface.

The location of the sub-munitions was identified as in an area that surface clearance had taken place.

The location of the M77 doesn't hinder the sampling teams operation.

The BACTEC EOD team will be called out remove or destroy the M77.

Recommendations

11. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:

The Sampling team continues to work on CBU 855 as directed.

Normal site setup is to continue as per SOP.

Signed: [Name removed], QA Officer, UN MACC SL

24 August 2007

Annexes:

A. M77 Site Photos

B. [Demining group] Completion Report (not included)

Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA: [None]

Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations: Seen/Agreed: Seen/Agreed

Comments by the DO Representative: [None]

Analysis

The primary cause of this incident is listed as *Inadequate survey* because the area had been tasked for a superficial surface (visual) clearance when at least one submunition had gone subsurface. The secondary cause is listed as a *Management control inadequacy* because the report makes no recommendation that the MACC SL who allocated the Task should correct their survey error after finding that it was inappropriate. It is remarkable that the report makes no recommendations for a secondary, subsurface clearance of an area where a device had been located subsurface. It is also strange that the investigator decided that the area was safe to enter and continue a visual Quality Assurance check when fully aware that sensitive items might be below the surface. The apparent irresponsibility of the management group is unusual. Because the investigation was carried out by the organization that made the errors, this incident is listed under Notes as having had "No independent investigation".