

DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 05/03/2011	Accident number: 613
Accident time: 08:35	Accident Date: 04/10/2009
Where it occurred: MF AF12401/21529/MF54 5, Khoshal village, Daman district, Kandahar Province	Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)	Secondary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)
Class: Excavation accident	Date of main report:
ID original source: OPS, 14/01-26	Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)	Ground condition: hard
Date record created:	Date last modified: 05/03/2011
No of victims: 1	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
use of pick (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. This record will be revised as more information becomes available.

The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)

File: OPS, 14/01-26

Date: November 30, 2009

Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] - CBDT-2 DEMINING ACCIDENT

Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] CBT-2 demining accident occurred on 04 October 2009 in Khoshal village, Daman district of Kandahar Province.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBT-2 DEMINING ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by the AMAC South to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] the Deminer of [Demining group] CBT-2. The accident occurred at 08:35 hours on 04 Oct 2009 at the minefield number AF12401/21529/MF545, located in Khoshal village, Daman district of Kandahar province.

SUMMARY:

MF # 545 is an anti-personnel contaminated area, located in eastern side of Kandahar Airport, part of mine belt around Kandahar Airfield (KAF). The area was of great importance from the military point of view, so the Russian troops planted mines there to protect their positions from the attacks of Mujahedeen and secure the KAF.

On 04 Oct 2009 at 08:35 hrs when [the Victim] deminer was working on a signal in his clearance lane using a pickaxe, he hit the mine on its top and caused it to go off. According to the investigation report the ground surface was hard and the deminer was using the pick without informing his section leader with a wrong procedure for excavation of the detected signal, and caused the mine to be exploded. As a result of the accident, the involve deminer got superficial injures on his face and body.

CONCLUSIONS:

However the deminer was trained how to conduct investigation on a detected signal, but he ignored the standard operating procedure and directly started from the pinpointed spot with a pick. Another factor in such accidents is poor supervision, as the command group failed to stop them from such a practice.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. The [Demining group] Operations department is to take more professional steps to build up a strong capacity of command and control mechanism within their teams.
- b. Good planning and site study for recognizing alternative solutions to safely handle operations in problematic portions of the clearance site through supervisor and team leaders is highly recommended.
- c. It is also the responsibility of command group to urge and advise the Deminers to strictly adhere to the SOP/AMAS.

d. As this is the one of several accidents with the same scenario (due to unprofessional use of pick) in Southern area, so it is to be taken to consideration by external QA as well.

e. The [Demining group] management should take necessary action in order to prevent recurrence of such accidents in future and inform MACCA OPS department of their action no later than 7 days after the issue date of this letter.

Victim Report

Victim number: 796	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: deminer	Fit for work: presumed
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Not recorded	Protection used: Not made available

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: minor Body, minor Face

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a *Field Control Inadequacy* because the Victim was using the pick incorrectly and his error was not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as a *Management Control Inadequacy* because the investigators identified a management failing in building the required command and control capacity in the field.

The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the UN to share it with others is regrettable.