

# DDAS Accident Report

## Accident details

<b>Report date:</b> 18/05/2006	<b>Accident number:</b> 278
<b>Accident time:</b> not recorded	<b>Accident Date:</b> 27/06/2001
<b>Where it occurred:</b> not made available	<b>Country:</b> Kuwait
<b>Primary cause:</b> Field control inadequacy (?)	<b>Secondary cause:</b> Inadequate training (?)
<b>Class:</b> Handling accident	<b>Date of main report:</b> [No date recorded]
<b>ID original source:</b> KMOD 16/SER 3	<b>Name of source:</b> Various/AVS 2001:K2
<b>Organisation:</b> Name removed	
<b>Mine/device:</b> PMN AP blast	<b>Ground condition:</b> not applicable
<b>Date record created:</b> 19/02/2004	<b>Date last modified:</b> 19/02/2004
<b>No of victims:</b> 1	<b>No of documents:</b> 1

## Map details

<b>Longitude:</b>	<b>Latitude:</b>
<b>Alt. coord. system:</b>	<b>Coordinates fixed by:</b>
<b>Map east:</b>	<b>Map north:</b>
<b>Map scale:</b> not recorded	<b>Map series:</b>
<b>Map edition:</b>	<b>Map sheet:</b>
<b>Map name:</b>	

## Accident Notes

no independent investigation available (?)

inadequate investigation (?)

inadequate training (?)

## Accident report

The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered 'Commercial in Confidence'. The following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in Kuwait at the time of the accident.

A commercial company was awarded an extensive contract that included the clearance of trenches along the coast in Kuwait city. The UXO that was safe to be collected was removed by "gangs" of ex-pat supervised Thai workers. Called "TCNs" (Third Country Nationals) the Thai workers were reported to have been given a one-day UXO handling course. They were not issued protective equipment.

With the exception of BLUs and M42s, the TCNs collected all items from the trench areas and took them either to “collecting areas” for later transportation, or to a demolition area. One report included the observation that even BLUs were moved for demolition towards the end of the clearance in order to speed up the process. M42s were always destroyed in-situ.

During the work, an unnamed TCN decided to light a PMN booster apparently “to frighten his mates”. The resulting explosion slightly damaged soft tissue on his hand.

## Victim Report

<b>Victim number:</b> 353	<b>Name:</b> Name removed
<b>Age:</b>	<b>Gender:</b> Male
<b>Status:</b> deminer	<b>Fit for work:</b> presumed
<b>Compensation:</b> not made available	<b>Time to hospital:</b> not recorded
<b>Protection issued:</b> None	<b>Protection used:</b> none

### Summary of injuries:

INJURIES

minor Hand

COMMENT

No medical report was made available.

### Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “*Field control inadequacy*” because the victim’s actions were not corrected by his Field Supervisor. The victim was also apparently ignorant of the risks he ran as he lit the booster, and so was inadequately trained. The secondary cause is listed as “*Inadequate training*”.

There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.